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The Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act: How Military
Members Are at the Mercy of
Unrestrained State Courts
A more complex mix of state and federal rules would be
hard to imagine. '
A major shift in the treatment of retired members of the U.S.
military occurred with the passage of the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act2 ("USFSPA" or "the Act") of 1982.
This Act of Congress allows state courts to divide a service mem-
ber's retirement pay during a divorce and requires the armed ser-
vice pay centers to make direct payment of military retirement
pay to former spouses under certain conditions. Though it pro-
vides much needed relief to many disadvantaged spouses, applica-
tion of the Act over twenty years has produced unintended effects.
The Act, by conferring great discretion on state courts to tailor eq-
uitable division of assets during a divorce, assigned to those state
courts responsibilities that are not being fulfilled. This discretion
can be particularly troublesome when a state is exercising juris-
diction over a service member in another state. This Comment will
delve into the issue of whether different state interpretations of
the Act result in substantially unequal treatment of service mem-
bers among the several states.
A preliminary understanding of military retirement pay is
necessary before an examination of the pertinent legislation. The
U.S. military offers a very generous retirement benefit. In some
1. Mark E. Sullivan, Military Pension Division: Crossing the Minefield,
31 FAM. L.Q. 19 (1997).
2. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000)).
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respects, it can be viewed as a benefit earned for service. In other
respects, it is a recruitment and retention tool for the armed
forces.3 The basic entitlement is 50% of base pay at twenty years
of service, increasing by 2.5% per year, up to a maximum of 75%
at thirty years.4 The notion that a military retiree gets "half-pay"
with a twenty-year retirement would be an oversimplification be-
cause specialty pays and other allowances do not carry forward
into retirement. The retirement pay will be substantially less than
this fraction of their last active-duty take-home pay;5 an amount
comparable to most other non-military retirement plans. 6
Additional justifications for this retirement system are the
maintenance of a youthful force, the maintenance of predictable
promotion with an "up or out system,"7 and compensation for the
substantial hardships associated with military life.8 Most impor-
tant, perhaps, is that retirees form a reserve manpower pool
available in a national emergency. 9 Military retirement differs
from many other retirements in that retirees are still considered
part of the armed forces' o subject to involuntary recall," and still
3. The references to this are numerous, and nearly all recruiting litera-
ture will stress the retirement benefits. As a start, visit the recruiting station
or view the services' recruitment web sites, at http://www.navy.com;
http://www.marines.com.
4. 10 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000). For purposes of simplification, this Comment
is limited to discussing regular, active-duty retired pay earned by service
members who entered service before September 8, 1980.
5. A typical Air Force officer retiree might be a lieutenant colonel retir-
ing at twenty years; his or her last month's active duty pay would be a base
pay of $6329.10, plus an additional $1755.20 per month in allowances (at na-
tional median rates), for a total of $8084.30 monthly gross income. Upon re-
tirement at twenty years, the gross retirement pay would be $3164.55, or
approximately 39% of the active duty gross pay amount. This would exclude
any incentive or bonus pay. Calculations are based on the January 1, 2003
Department of Defense Monthly Basic Pay Table, available at http://www.dod
.mil/militarypay/pay/bp/paytables/Jan2003.html.
6. See supra notes 3-5.
7. American military officers must be promoted to certain ranks by a
certain point (time in service) of their careers or they are separated from the
service. This is often termed the "up or out" promotion system. See, e.g., Ricks
v. United States, 278 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
8. See Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, 10 U.S.C. § 101
(2000).
9. S. REP. No. 97-252, at 51 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1555, 1634.
10. United Sates v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, 246 (1881).
11. 10 U.S.C. § 688(a)-(b)(1) (2000).
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subject to the military justice system when receiving military re-
tirement pay.12 As such, the military retirement pay is also re-
ferred to as "retainer pay."13 Retired members are eligible for
recall, but can lose their eligibility through actions such as crimi-
nal activity.14 Military retirement also differs in that it is non-
contributory, has no cash value, and cannot be passed on to
heirs.15 Given the foregoing, most attempts to equate the military
retirement system to other retirement systems fail. 16
The military retirement system also meets other goals beyond
providing a retirement annuity. Military retirees retire substan-
tially earlier than others. 7 In addition, military personnel may
have combat specialties that do not translate well into civilian
employment, so when a military retiree starts a second career, ad-
ditional education or training is often required. 8 The "needs of the
service" frequently require a service member to work in a career
field that may not be what they would choose for a post-service ca-
reer.' 9 Furthermore, because of their frequent moves, military
personnel often do not have community roots on which to fall
back. Military retirement pay thereby also serves an important
function during the transition to civilian life.20 A military retiree
suffers a significant drop in income immediately upon retire-
12. Id. § 802(a)(4).
13. Id. § 1408(a)(7).
14. See Captain Kristine D. Kuenzli, Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act: Is There Too Much Protection for the Former Spouse? 47 A.F.
L. REV. 1, 5 n.33 (1999).
15. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2) (2000).
16. Just the retirement age alone is enough to make it unique without
the recall procedures. Compare the military retirement eligibility - a typical
military enlisted retiree may retire as early as age 38 (enlist at age 18 with
20 years service) - with federal civil service retirement at age 55 as the earli-
est for most people. See U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., Federal Employees
Retirement System chart at http://www.opm.gov/retire/html/faqs/faqll.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003). A search by the author has not uncovered a system
similar to the military one-either in benefits or responsibilities. See also S.
REP. No. 97-502 at 50, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1555, 1633.
17. Mary J. Bradley, Calling for a Truce on the Military Divorce Battle-
field: A Proposal to Amend the USFSPA, 168 MIL. L. REV. 40, 40 n.7 (2001).
18. See S. REP. No. 100-13 at 6 (1987).
19. See generally Garnishment of Veterans' Benefits to Pay Child Support
and Other Court-Ordered Family Obligations Before the House Veterans' Af-fairs Committee, 105th Cong. 13 (1998) (testimony from multiple witnesses
with regard to military life and service), 1998 WL 461086.
20. Id.
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ment.21 With the average military member moving about every
two to three years,22 many do not own homes and the military re-
tirement plan is their most significant asset.23 In short, the mili-
tary retirement has other goals and purposes aside from being a
mere pension plan.
The fundamental issue raised throughout this Comment is
whether division of military retirement pay is a divorce or a mili-
tary issue. If clearly a divorce issue, then it would be left to the
states; if it is a military issue, then the federal government retains
authority.2A As noted at the outset, "A more complex mix of state
and federal rules would be hard to imagine."5 An objective look at
the Act indicates that both play a role; the states, which govern
marital law, may divide what the federal government, which gov-
erns military law, determines to be the divisible pay.26 Congress,
however, must ensure that military members are treated roughly
equal in every state.27 The unique recall status of the military re-
tiree, and the lack of choice over assignments during the course of
a military career, are factors unique to the military retirement
system, which deserve special consideration in divorce actions.
This Comment will address this fundamental issue in five
parts. Part I sets the stage by discussing the United States Su-
preme Court decision that brought the issue of division of military
21. See supra note 5.
22. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL-LONGER TIME
BETWEEN MovEs RELATED TO HIGHER SATISFACTION AND RETENTION, GAO-01-
841 (2001).
23. Garnishment of Veterans' Benefits to Pay Child Support and Other
Court-Ordered Family Obligations Before the House Veterans' Affairs Com-
mittee, 105th Cong. 19-20 (1998) (statement of Joyce Wessel Raezer, National
Military Family Association), 1998 WL 461086.
24. The two views were addressed squarely in McCarty by Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist in the Court's opinion and the dissent, respectively.
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-38 (1981).
25. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 19. It is possible to reconcile the two views
as a military matter. In testimony regarding the USFSPA, all statements and
the resulting report discussed balancing the needs of the service member and
the needs of the spouse. Clearly, the military recognizes the need for equity
for both. See S. REP. No. 97-502, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1555, 1601.
26. The statute says the states may consider the disposable retired pay in
a divorce, but never defines "disposable retired pay." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4),
(c) (2000).
27. See generally McCarty, 453 U.S. at 234. One can argue that Congress
has a duty to do so. See Part V infra.
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retirement pay to the forefront and the immediate legislative re-
sponse-the USFSPA. Part II discusses the application of the
USFSPA by analyzing subsequent Supreme Court decisions and
the states' role within this application. Part III identifies the
shortcomings in USFSPA. Part IV outlines past attempts to mod-
ify the USFSPA and contends that further Congressional action is
necessary. Part V then recommends particular measures designed
to correct the noted deficiencies. The conclusion posits the
USFSPA, though a needed measure, remains in desperate need of
refinement.
I. THE MCCARTY DECISION AND THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER
SPOUSES' PROTECTION ACT
A. The McCarty Decision
Prior to 1981, many courts differed on the issue of dividing
the retirement pay during a divorce.28 The Supreme Court finally
decided the issue in the landmark opinion of McCarty v.
McCarty.29 Colonel Richard McCarty, an Army doctor, retired af-
ter twenty years of service. 30 Colonel McCarty and his wife were
married for eighteen of those twenty years.31 During the divorce
proceeding, the California Superior Court held that the military
retirement pay was quasi-community property and awarded his
spouse forty-five percent, based on her half-interest in the portion
earned during the marriage.32 The California Court of Appeals af-
firmed this ruling.33 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.34
The question before the Court was whether federal law precluded
28. See, e.g., Kruger v. Kruger, 375 A.2d 659 (N.J. 1977) (holding that
military retirement pay was property subject to division in a divorce); Ellis v.
Ellis, 552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976) (holding that military retirement pay was not
property divisible in a divorce).
29. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
30. Id. at 218.
31. Id. at 216.
32. Id. at 217-18. Eighteen years is ninety percent (90%) of twenty years;
dividing in half yields forty-five percent (45%).
33. Id. at 218.
34. Id. at 219.
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state courts from dividing military retirement pay; the Court
ruled in the affirmative and overturned the California decision.35
The Court examined the history and purpose of the military
retirement system in great detail, determined that it was meant to
be a personal entitlement of the retiree, and held it could not be
split by state courts.36 In doing so, the Court reasoned that state
division of military pay would have detrimental effects on the
military.37 The Court, however, did note the seeming inequities for
the ex-spouse of a military retiree, but stated that the matter was
for Congress to fix.38 Congress eagerly took up this issue at its
first opportunity with the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act,39 a very controversial measure throughout the ini-
tial debate, subsequent enaction and ultimate implementation.
B. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
The Congressional response to McCarty was swift.40 After the
decision was announced, there was a great outcry over its impact
on spouses.41 In the next session of Congress, the USFSPA was in-
troduced and passed.42 This measure contains two major provi-
sions: (1) state courts may consider the military pension as
divisible marital property; (2) the uniformed services are required
to pay any court-ordered share directly to the spouse.43 The
USFSPA only addresses this issue from the standpoint of defining
the maximum amount the armed services are required to pay di-
rectly to the former spouse under valid court orders;44 it does not
interfere with state laws to limit the amount that states may
award.45
35. Id. at 210.
36. See generally id. at 211-27.
37. Id. at 234-35.
38. Id. at 235-36.
39. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000)).
40. Kuenzli, supra note 14, at 7-8.
41. See DAVID CLAYTON CARRAD, THE COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK: DIVID-
ING ERISA, MILITARY, AND CIVIL SERVICE PENSIONS AND COLLECTING CHILD
SUPPORT FROM EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 155 (2000).
42. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000).
43. Id. § 1408(c)-(d).
44. Id. § 1408(c)(1).
45. Id. § 1408(e)(6).
USFSPA
For the provisions of the Act to apply, certain thresholds must
be met. First, a court must find an overlap of at least ten years of
marriage with ten years of military service.46 Retirement pay for
less overlap may still be split by the state courts; however, the
military is not obligated to follow the order47 Second, the state
must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the service
member and the USFSPA prohibits states from using the Act to
extend personal jurisdiction beyond previous limits.48
The Act was passed on September 8, 1982, but was made ret-
roactive to be effective for divorces finalized after June 25, 1981,
the day prior to the McCarty decision.49 The Act also clearly ad-
dressed some of the Supreme Court concerns about the nature of
the pay 0 by establishing that the Act does not create for the
spouse a "right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned,
transferred, or likewise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a
spouse or former spouse."51
The fifty-percent maximum split under this Act would apply
whenever a marriage overlaps with the entirety of the military
service.5 2 If the overlap is less, the maximum fraction available to
the state courts for division will be less.5 3 If the parties to a di-
vorce are unable to agree on a split of the retirement pay, the
maximum calculation based on the Act is a presumption for the
service member to overcome. 54
The USFSPA provides other benefits as well. For the spouses,
the Act also authorizes support from the military that has tradi-
46. Id. § 1408(d)(2).
47. Kuenzli, supra note 14, at 30.
48. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4).
49. H.R. REP. No. 97-252, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N
1555, 1599.
50. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 222-34 (1981).
51. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2).
52. See id. § 1408(d), (e)(1).
53. An example would be a theoretical retiree who marries his spouse
halfway through a 20-year career. If they were to divorce after 20 years of
marriage, she would only be entitled to a maximum of 25% because she was
married to her husband for only 10 years of his 20-year career, so only 50% of
the pension would be eligible for consideration. It is then split between the
two parties to yield 25%.
54. See Bradley, supra note 17, at 56 n.83.
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tionally been considered part of the total compensation package.
55
It allows spouses who meet the ten-year overlap rule to have con-
tinued commissary (grocery store) and exchange (shopping center)
privileges where substantial savings are often available,56 and
provides continued medical and dental coverage. 57 Additionally, a
benefit to the federal government is that the state authority to
split the military pensions now mirrors state authority to divide
pensions of the Civil Service and Foreign Service retirees, elimi-
nating a discrepancy that concerned the Court in McCarty.58
Debate over substantial modifications to the Act has not pro-
duced results. Divorced spouses are viewed as a group worthy of a
great deal of sympathy because some have been wronged.59 Al-
though circumstances surrounding these divorces vary greatly,
Congress's reluctance to step into this "minefield"60 has resulted in
only failed attempts to substantially modify the Act.61
In the end, Congress has made only minor changes to the Act.
Most have been non-controversial and generally convey benefit to
the spouse, not the retiree.62 A 1993 change for abused former
spouses was welcome and needed. Prior to 1993, abused spouses
55. Total military compensation refers to all methods of compensation-
pay, benefits, and tax savings. See Department of Defense Military Compen-
sation, at http://www.dod.millmilitarypay/pay/ index.html; supra note 5.
56. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
252, 96 Stat. 734, Sec. 1005 (1982) (to be enacted by Department of Defense
regulations).
57. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072-1074. Children remained covered if registered as a
dependent of the service member up until age 18 or age 23 if a full-time stu-
dent. Id.
58. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230-32.
59. Divorced spouses have their own lobbying group, EX-POSE (Ex-
Partners of Service Members for Equality) at http://www.ex-pose.org. They
have had a significant impact; in testimony before the House Veteran's Af-
fairs Committee on August 5, 1998, sixteen witnesses testified on behalf of
the changes, and only two groups, including EX-POSE and another group of
former spouses testified against the changes. Garnishment of Veterans' Bene-
fits to Pay Child Support and Other Court-Ordered Family Obligations Before
the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, 105th Cong. 22 (1998), 1998 WL
461086.
60. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 19.
61. See Kuenzli, supra note 14, at 47.
62. Garnishment of Veterans' Benefits to Pay Child Support and Other
Court-Ordered Family Obligations Before the House Veterans' Affairs Com-
mittee, 105th Cong. 13-14 (1998) (statement of Frank W. Ault, American Re-
tirees Association), 1998 WL 461086.
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faced a dilemma if the military member had qualified for retire-
ment but remained on active duty: either put up with the abuse
until retirement or seek protection that could result in the mem-
ber's dishonorable discharge from the service and loss of the re-
tirement benefit.63 The Act permits the spouse to receive benefits,
even if the testimony resulted in the discharge of the active duty
member without pay or benefits. One change that does benefit a
military retiree provides a different method of calculating the pay
subject to division-the pay remaining after any non-taxable de-
ductions.64
Understandably, the Act is not popular with military retir-
ees.
65
II. APPLICATION OF THE USFSPA
A. Post-USFSPA Supreme Court Decisions
With McCarty effectively overruled by the USFSPA, the Su-
preme Court military divorce law jurisprudence has remained
mostly dormant over the last twenty-one years, leaving much
room for state interpretation. The first Supreme Court action to
address the issue of military retirement pay demonstrates the di-
vergent state court interpretations of the Act. In 1986, the Court
denied certiorari in an appeal from a California denial of a request
to reopen a divorce finalized between McCarty and the passage of
the Act, the so-called "retroactive period."66 The dissent noted that
two states, Arizona and Delaware, had already authorized retro-
active application of the Act to reopen property settlements for di-
vorces that were finalized between the McCarty decision and the
63. Kuenzli, supra note 14, at 42-43.
64. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (2000).
65. The forums for voicing such dissent are many. A typical response is
captured in a private web site which provides a slanted view of the history
and legality of the USFSPA. However, one interesting link includes individ-
ual stories of treatment by state courts under the USFSPA at http://www.the
Act-t-shirts.com.
66. Cox v. Cox, 479 U.S. 970, 970 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). As ad-
dressed previously, the Act was passed on September 8, 1982, to take effect
on June 25, 1981, one day prior to the McCarty decision.
2003]
298 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:289
passage of the Act.67 As a result, the decision whether to apply the
Act retroactively was left to the states.68
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the characteri-
zation of retirement pay remains within domain of Congress. 69 In
Barker v. Kansas,70 a 1992 tax discrimination case, the Court reit-
erated that military retirement pay is deferred pay for past ser-
vices.71 The importance of the Barker decision reinforces
McCarty's clear direction that Congress has the responsibility to
oversee spousal division of military retirement pay. Another tenet
of Barker advises states to tread lightly in this area because of the
overwhelming federal concerns in the area of military pensions.7 2
Mansell v. Mansel7 3 marked the most significant judicial
treatment of military divorces since McCarty. The Court's decision
addressed the interplay of military retired pay and military dis-
ability pay. Retirees who receive a disability rating from the Vet-
erans Administration can elect to offset their retired pay, dollar
for dollar, to receive disability pay.74 The net effect of this is to re-
duce the disposable retirement pay available for division in a di-
vorce. Though there are valid reasons for this election,75 it can also
be viewed as a one-sided option to reduce the payments to a
spouse.76 In addressing this issue in Mansell, the Supreme Court
examined the military retirement system. 77 Mansell involved a re-
tired Air Force officer receiving disability pay, who divorced in
1979.78 In the California divorce decree, the retiree agreed to a
fifty percent division of his total retirement pay including the
amount of pay he had waived for the disability pay.79 After pas-
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981).
70. 503 U.S. 594 (1992).
71. Id. at 605.
72. See id. at 604-05.
73. 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
74. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1401 (2000).
75. Disability pay is non-taxable and designed to compensate the dis-
abled veteran for lost wage-earning capability. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 583-84.
See also 26 U.S.C. § 104(4) (2000) (exempting from gross income any annuity
for injury resulting from injury or sickness in the armed forces).
76. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 595 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 583.
78. Id. at 585.
79. Id. at 586.
USFSPA
sage of the Act, he requested that the courts modify this decree to
reflect the statute's concept of disposable pay, which reduced the
amount going to his former spouse.8 0 The trial court refused to
modify the decree and the California Court of Appeals upheld the
lower court.81 The Supreme Court held that the Act did not grant
the states, when calculating pay available for division, the right to
consider retirement pay waived for disability benefits.8 2 The Su-
preme Court based its decision on the plain language of the Act,
noting that it only addresses division of retirement pay.8 3 The
Court disagreed with the former spouse's argument that the Act's
limits on pay orders should include the retirement pay that the
service member voluntarily waives to get a different benefit.8 4
Read together, these three Supreme Court decisions indicate
that Congress intended only a limited role for the states in the di-
vision of military retirement pay.
B. State Application
1. The Role of the States
During the enactment of the USFSPA, Congress clearly indi-
cated its basis for granting this authority to the states to divide
the retirement pay. Though some discussion centered on the sup-
port that spouses provide the service members in their careers,
such as entertaining or supporting other spouses in the military
unit, most testimony focused on the frequent moves encountered
in most military careers and the subsequent disruptions to the
education and careers that spouses of service members often ex-
perience.85 Congress reasoned that allowing the retirement pay to
be split as property during a divorce provided compensation to
military spouses for this disruption.86 The Congressional hearings
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 595.
83. Id. at 592. "The Act's definitional section specifically defines the term
'disposable retired or retainer pay' to exclude, inter alia, military retirement
pay waived in order to receive veterans' disability payments. [10 U.S.C.]
§ 1408(a)(4)(B)." Id. at 589.
84. Id. at 592.
85. S. REP. No. 97-502 at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1555,
1601.
86. Id. at 7.
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also found the states capable of making an equitable division of
this property and the existing state procedures adequate to pro-
tect the service members.8 7 The Congressional hearings embraced
the view expressed in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in McCarty that
federal action normally would not be warranted, since divorce is
not an enumerated power of the federal government in the U.S.
Constitution and has traditionally been the province of the
States.88
When a service member must defend a divorce in a state far
removed from his or her place of residence, jurisdictional issues
add to the already complex application of the Act. Most states al-
low a spouse to file for divorce after only a short residency in that
state or on the basis of a former residence.89 A state's jurisdiction
over the service member might equate to jurisdiction over the
pension.90 If the service member fails to respond in a timely man-
ner, or subjects herself to the personal jurisdiction of the state be-
fore challenging that jurisdiction,91 state courts, in some
instances, have split the pay of the military retiree.92 This sug-
gests that some states may be predisposed to exercise jurisdiction
over retirees. Federal law codifies some protection for the service
members,93 but they often do not have the resources to fight the
87. Id. at 2.
88. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 237 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
89. See DANIEL SITARZ, LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIVORCE (1999) (pro-
viding a state by state breakdown on requirements).
90. Delrie v. Harris, 962 F. Supp. 931, 934 (W.D. La. 1997) (equating ju-
risdiction over the service member or retiree for the divorce with allowing
continuing jurisdiction for the retired pay). However, a recent court case in
California provides an excellent argument that the service member should be
able to participate in other aspects of the divorce and not consent to division
of his retired pay if the court otherwise lacks jurisdiction over him or her. See
In re Marriage of Stroup, No. D030869, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4687
(Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2003).
91. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 29-31. See also Wagner v. Wagner, 768
A.2d 1112, 1115-17 (Pa. 2002) (discussing in dicta measures that an out-of-
state respondent might take to avoid inadvertently consenting to jurisdiction,
but also noting that a service member taking these measures might run con-
trary to the military custom of following the laws).
92. See, e.g., Burt v. Burt, 53 P.3d 101 (Wyo. 2002).
93. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (2000). This statute states that, "[a] court may
not treat the disposable pay of a member in the manner described in para-
graph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member .... " Id.
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proceedings.94 As a result, the service members may have to de-
fend a divorce action in a state far from their residence.
Another factor that can work against the military retiree is
timing. In a divorce action near retirement, the military member
may find herself at a financial low point.95 The divorce action
would then make the transition to civilian life even more difficult.
A number of state court cases first examined the implementa-
tion of the USFSPA, then later explored the limits of the states'
ability to divide the retirement pay under the Act. Although there
have been a flurry of cases, many legal issues remain unresolved.
Widely varying state court decisions create confusion as to the
proper interpretation of the Act.
2. Differing State Interpretations of the USFSPA
Only the USFSPA addresses the issue of division of military
retirement pay in a divorce. The Supreme Court has yet to inter-
pret the Act as placing a limit on state division of the military re-
tirement as the state courts see as equitable. In the absence of
such interpretation, state courts have interpreted the Act differ-
ently.96 The examples below illustrate this point.
First, state courts have subjected the operative words of the
statute to different interpretations. The statute allows state courts
to "treat disposable retired pay.., either as property solely of the
member or as property of the member and his spouse in accor-
dance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court."97 Although
this statutory language would seem to leave much discretion to
the state courts to divide the military retirement pay as they see
fit, another school of thought holds that this provision should be
limited by another provision that states that direct payments to
the spouse from military pay centers "may not exceed [fifty] per-
94. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 29-31 (discussing possible pitfalls in the
jurisdiction battle).
95. See generally MARSHA L. THOLE AND FRANK W. AULT, DIVORCE AND
THE MILITARY, 123-48 (1998) (describing the issues involved in a military di-
vorce).
96. The basic provision allowing state courts to divide the pay as marital
property states no specific limit. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c). However, a later provi-
sion limits the military pay centers to paying only fifty percent directly to the
spouse and may reflect the true intent of Congress. See id. § 1408(e)(1). With-
out interpretation, this may remain a distinction without a difference.
97. Id. § 1408(c)(1).
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cent of such disposable retired pay."98 The following two lines of
cases illustrate these divergent interpretations.
A number of states have found that these two subsections,
when read together, impose a limit on state court authority to di-
vide retirement pay. The Washington Supreme Court, in the case
of In re Marriage of Smith,99 held "a court may award up to [fifty]
percent of the disposable retired or retainer pay to the nonmilitary
spouse ..... o0 0 The Idaho Supreme Court later echoed this ap-
proach when it held the "USFSPA prohibits a state court from
awarding the non-military spouse the right to collect more than
[fifty] percent" of the retirement pay.101
Other states have taken the opposite view and interpreted the
fifty-percent cap as a limitation only on the amount of payment
that can be made directly by the military, rather than a limitation
on the division of the retirement as marital property by state
courts. The Minnesota Court of Appeals in the case of Deliduka v.
Deliduka,0 2 stated that any amounts above fifty percent awarded
by the state court would be paid by the retiree directly to the for-
mer spouse. 0 3 The North Dakota Supreme Court also addressed
this issue, stating the text of the statute supported the former
spouse's argument that a higher division was possible. 104
A decision from the Kansas federal district court, In re
MacMeeken,10 5 addressed this issue and recognized that state
courts were split on their interpretations of the fifty-percent
cap. 106 In overturning a bankruptcy court determination that an
award to the former spouse in excess of fifty percent of the retire-
98. Id. § 1408(e)(1).
99. 669 P.2d 448 (Wash. 1983).
100. Id. at 451.
101. Beesley v. Beesley, 758 P.2d 695, 699 (Ida. 1988). However, the court
went on to say that other assets might then be awarded disproportionately to
ensure an equitable division of marital assets. Id. This author would have no
objection to that interpretation. Alternatively, a military retiree could agree
to a higher division of retirement pay in exchange for another valuable asset,
such as a house.
102. 347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1984).
103. Id. at 55.
104. Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 909 (N.D. 1984) (interpreting 10
U.S.C. § 1408(e)(6) (2000)).
105. 117 B.R. 642 (D.Kan. 1990).
106. Id. at 643 n.1 (citing Smith, 669 P.2d 448; Beesley, 758 P.2d 695; De-
liduka, 347 N.W.2d 52; Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904).
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ment pay was not supported by the Act, the Court held the fifty-
percent limitation applied only to the direct payments from the
service pay center.107 In doing so, the Court also noted that noth-
ing in the legislative history "mandated" a contrary interpreta-
tion. 08
The second area where state courts have arguably differed
from the Act or Supreme Court precedent is in the offset of re-
tirement pay for disability pay. Although Mansell clearly set
precedent that this pay should be excluded,10 9 a 1999 Washington
Supreme Court decision, in re Marriage of Jennings,110 allowed
modification of the divorce decree to grant alimony to the former
spouse to compensate for the service member's election of disabil-
ity pay."' The court reasoned that an equitable division of prop-
erty had been made at the time of the divorce decree and held that
the Veterans Administration's action to grant a disability benefit
unfairly altered that decision." 2 Therefore, the trial court was al-
lowed to award alimony in the amount of the retirement pay ex-
changed for disability pay."3 Although the Jennings decision does
not conflict with the letter of the Mansell decision, it certainly
would seem to conflict with its spirit," 4 as well as Congress's de-
sire, through federal veterans' compensation statutes," 5 to provide
for those injured during the course of military service. It is disin-
genuous for the state courts to reconstruct divorce decrees well af-
ter the fact, absent some sort of fraud or surprise, to avoid federal
statutory restrictions or Supreme Court precedents.
With contradictory state court interpretations of the Act, mili-
tary members in like circumstances are being treated differently
by different states.
107. Id. at 644-45.
108. Id. at 647.
109. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989).
110. 980 P.2d 1248 (Wash. 1999).
111. Id. at 1256-57.
112. Id. at 1255-56.
113. Id. at 1256.
114. The rationale is that disability pay decreases the amount of
disposable retired pay; the USFSPA (and Mansell) only allow for division of
the military retired pay. The spirit of Mansell is that disability pay is
excluded from the calculation. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594-95.
115. The basic provisions for veteran's disability benefit for wartime and
peacetime injuries are contained in 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000) and 38 U.S.C. §
1131 (2000), respectively.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
As a preliminary matter, the USFSPA was challenged as un-
constitutional based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the
Act to be facially constitutional.116
A. Unequal Treatment and Equal Protection117
As discussed above, states are unfairly subjecting service
members to unequal treatment under the USFSPA Our American
military tradition dictates that the military owes allegiance to the
federal, not a state, government."18 Since allegiance to each of the
fifty states, as part of the nation, is uniform, the treatment of a
military member within each state, and among the states, should
also be uniform. Not only does this follow from the military obliga-
tion, it follows from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, which prohibits the states from denying persons the "equal
protection of the laws." 19 Although this clause is most often in-
voked with regard to the application of a state's laws within the
borders of that state, the clause's plain language would suggest
applicability to divergent state court interpretations of federal
law. Equal protection is just that-all persons are to be assured
equal application of and equal standing under the laws, federal or
state. Hypothetically speaking, if two military members, John
Navy, a resident of Washington, and Jane Army, a resident of
Minnesota, were to both seek divorce within their respective
states, Jane's spouse could be awarded a much higher percentage
116. Fern v. United States, 908 F.2d 955, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
117. The term "equal protection" normally applies to similarly situated in-
dividuals being treated differently by a single governmental entity. However,
since the ability to split the retirement pay stems only from an act of Con-
gress, states can be thought of as agents of the federal government and un-
equal treatment in division of military by differing states lends itself to
standard equal protection arguments. The author acknowledges that viewing
equal protection in this manner is an extension from traditional constitu-
tional analysis, but is warranted in these circumstances because the argu-
ment that follows upholds the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause.
118. Military service members swear to "defend the Constitution of the
United States." Garnishment of Veterans' Benefits to Pay Child Support and
Other Court-Ordered Family Obligations Before the House Veterans' Affairs
Committee, 105th Cong. 16 (1998) (testimony of Major Neita Armstrong,
United States Marine Corps), 1998 WL 461086.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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of the retirement pay.120 The State of Washington arguably could
have violated Jane's equal protection right to be treated equally to
John and every other military member throughout the country.
The combination of military members moving from state to
state, low thresholds for states establishing personal jurisdiction
over service members not currently residing in that state, and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, 121 exacerbate the
potential severity of this violation of equal protection. Slightly al-
tering the above hypothetical, if both John Navy and Jane Army
live in Washington, but Jane is subject to personal jurisdiction in
Minnesota, then, by virtue of full faith and credit, two military
members who live in the same state would be subject to conflicting
interpretations of the Act. Equal protection should shield mem-
bers of our military from conflicting divisions of marital property
based upon different state interpretations of federal law.
B. The USFSPA in Light of Apprendi
As a result of a recent Supreme Court decision that empha-
sized the role of juries, a substantive due process challenge may be
in the offing. In Apprendi v. New Jersey,122 the Supreme Court
overturned a New Jersey statute that allowed a judge to enhance
a criminal sentence based on his or her evaluation of the defen-
dant's motive. 23 The Court held that such enhancement was an
issue of fact that should have been decided by a jury.1' 4 Although
Apprendi has primarily impacted criminal cases, 5 at least one
federal district court has discussed the possible application of Ap-
prendi in civil cases. In Reliance National Insurance Company
(Europe) Ltd. v. Hanover 26 the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts discussed, in dicta, the possible ap-
plication of Apprendi to admiralty cases, where a plaintiffs choice
of the admiralty forum precludes a defendant's right to a jury
120. See supra Part II.B.2.
121. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
122. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
123. Id. at 472-74.
124. Id. at 467.
125. As of September 26, 2003, more than 5,000 decisions in all the cir-
cuits and 44 states had cited Apprendi. Search for case and citations by title
at http://www.lexis.com.
126. 222 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Mass 2002).
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trial. 127 The essence of the district court's argument posited that
some areas of the law have distinct procedures that deviate from
American legal norms, such as the right to trial by jury, and may
not conform to constitutional guarantees like those addressed in
Apprendi.128
This same line of reasoning could be extended to USFSPA
cases. Divorce cases may be handled in summary proceedings by
marital masters without a jury.129 The stakes in a military divorce
can be quite high because the pension may be the only asset of
value in the divorce. 30 In enacting the USFSPA, Congress in-
tended to help spouses disadvantaged in their own education and
careers because of their spouses' military careers.' 3' In addition,
the Act assumes an equal contribution of the spouses to the mili-
tary career, but like the time element, 32 is a rebuttable presump-
tion that could be overcome with evidence to the contrary.133 With
questions of fact regarding the spouse's actual contribution to the
military career determining the division of possibly the sole sub-
stantial marital asset, in this context Apprendi could be extended
to constitutionally require that a jury find these facts. If a state
does not allow a jury trial on such an important issue, then a pro-
cedural due process challenge to a state court's application of the
Act, in light of Apprendi, might be successful. Based on the num-
ber of cases that have applied Apprendi and its potential applica-
tions to civil cases, divorce proceedings may be ripe for such a
challenge. As discussed in the introduction, 134 divorces of military
personnel are unique, and the value of the military pension in
terms of length of the pension (early start age), timing (right as
one transitions to civilian life after a long military career), and the
conditions associated with it (post-military employment and vul-
127. Id. at 116 n.12.
128. See id. at 115-16.
129. See Witte v. Justices of the N.H. Superior Court, 831 F.2d 362 (1st
Cir. 1987) (holding that the use of marital masters is constitutional because
the masters act under the authority and supervision of a judge).
130. Bradley, supra note 17, at 41-42.
131. See S. REP. No. 97-502, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1595, 1601.
132. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
133. See S. REP. No. 97-502, at 10-11.
134. See supra notes 7-23 and accompanying text.
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nerability to recall), make likely that Apprendi will be used with
regard to the Act in the foreseeable future.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE USFSPA
The USFSPA may be most striking in what it does not ad-
dress-the interplay of the division of retirement pay with other
issues, most notably child support. If the parties to a divorce have
minor children, the retirement pay takes on a dual personality.
The retirement pay is considered to be both (1) joint property un-
der the Act when determining equitable distribution of assets and
(2) current income for calculation of child support.135 If the retire-
ment pay is the primary income source for the retiree and is split
fifty-fifty, state courts may then award up to another fifteen per-
cent of that amount as child support.136 Additional unlimited
charges may also be levied for children's extracurricular expenses
or medical bills. 137 With sixty-five percent, or greater, of the re-
tired pay designated for the ex-spouse, the retiree bears a heavy
burden which can limit post-military opportunities. The Act seems
to accept the fact that states may award more than sixty-five per-
cent of the retirement pay to the spouse even though such an
award would exceed the direct payment limits contained within
the Act.138
The Act also does not address any special incentives to reduce
the size of the armed forces, such as was used in 1992.139 To en-
courage voluntary departures, Congress created the Voluntary
Separation Incentive (VSI) and the Special Separation Bonus
(SSB), which provide, respectively, a reduced annuity for twice the
number of years of service and a one-time bonus for departure
from the military prior to normal retirement qualification.140 State
divorce proceedings have viewed these special incentives differ-
135. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(l)-(2) (2000).
136. Id. § 1408(e)(4)(B). A maximum of sixty-five percent of the disposable
retirement pay may then be paid directly to the spouse to cover his or her
share of the retirement and child support together.
137. Id. § 1408(e)(6). Payments above sixty-five percent do not have to be
paid directly, but are still the responsibility of the service member. See also
THOLE AND AULT, supra note 95, at 15-16.
138. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(6) (2000).
139. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, §§ 661-64, 105 Stat. 1394 (1991).
140. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1174-1175 (2000).
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ently. The decisions have focused on whether VSI or SSB may be
considered compensation for a service member's non-vested mili-
tary pension. 141 An Ohio court has held the VSI to be non-divisible
in a divorce because it has more the character of a severance pay
than a reduced retirement benefit, even though it is paid in yearly
increments rather than as one lump sum. 42 Timing was critical to
the court's decision; the military member's decision to separate
from the military, made before the divorce, distinguished it from a
situation where a voluntary decision to separate from the military
occurred after the divorce was final.143 State courts may not ap-
preciate that a separation from the military that appears to be
voluntary may in fact be involuntary or one taken in lieu of an an-
ticipated involuntary action, making it a voluntary separation in
name only.44 Other states have not made such a distinction and
elected to treat the VSI and SSB payments as retirement benefits,
using the authority provided by the Act to divide the VSI and SSB
between the retiree and the spouse. 45 This problem may arise
more with the annual VSI annuity, which could appear to be simi-
lar to the actual retirement benefit. 40 Whichever treatment is
proper, the inconsistencies must be settled with finality to avoid
inconsistent treatment of service members by the states.
The language of the Act regarding one aspect of the division of
retirement pay has been found to be ambiguous. The military pay
tables are based on rank and length of service. 47 The retirement
141. McClure v. McClure, 647 N.E.2d 832, 841 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). Ser-
vice pensions do not "vest" similar to other pension plans until a service
member qualifies for military retirement. Kelly v. Kelly, 78 P.3d 220, (Wyo.
2003).
142. McClure, 647 N.E.2d at 841.
143. Id. at 841-42.
144. The characterizations used by the military may be misleading to the
uninformed. An analogous situation exists in the "up or out" promotion sys-
tem for officers. Though they must leave by a specified point in their career,
there is some flexibility in the timing. The officer uses a "Voluntary Applica-
tion for Retirement" to set the procedure in motion, even though such a sepa-
ration is characterized as involuntary by 10 U.S.C. § 632(b) (2000). State
courts may not accept such a characterization if there is anything but a
drumming out of the service, at midnight, at bayonet point!
145. See In re Marriage of Crawford, 884 P.2d 210, 213 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994); Kelson v. Kelson, 675 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Fla. 1996).
146. See Kuenzli, supra note 14, at 34 n.234.
147. See Monthly Basic Pay Table, effective Jan. 1, 2003, at
http://www.dod.mil/militarypay.
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pay, like regular pay, is based on the table incorporating rank and
length of service calculated4 8 In the interpretation of the Act,
courts are divided on whether to base the retirement pay division
on the entitlement at the time of the divorce (if before the end of
the career) or the final rank and length of service when the service
member retires. 149 Though an argument has been made that the
final rank is determined by earlier career actions during the mar-
riage and a former spouse should benefit from her contributions,
the former would be more logical because it would award the for-
mer spouse the benefit actually earned during the time of the
marriage. 5 0
Service members may enter educational or vocational training
programs upon retirement from military service. To encourage
post-service education,' 5 ' Congress enacted the Montgomery G.I.
Bill to provide educational benefits, based on a small contribution
from the service member combined with a larger contribution from
the government.15 2 If the circumstances of a divorce decree make it
impossible for a military retiree to continue to attend school, state
interpretation of the Act can thwart the goals of the Montgomery
Bill. The post-service educational benefit (often referred to as the
"G.I. Bill") was first enacted to ease World War II veterans back
into society'53 and, although it has changed over the years, such a
benefit is available today,'5 reflecting its continuing importance
in the eyes of the services and Congress.55 Therefore, any state
application of the Act that would effectively negate this important
educational benefit would be unsound. Under normal tenets of
148. Retirement pay is just a percentage of the active duty pay at the time
of retirement. See supra Part I.
149. Bradley, supra note 17, at 102.
150. Garnishment of Veterans' Benfits to Pay Child Support and Other
Court-Ordered Family Obligations Before the House Veterans' Affairs Com-
mittee, 105th Cong. 19-20 (1998) (statement of Joyce Wessel Raezer, National
Military Family Association), 1998 WL 461086.
151. S. REP. No. 100-13, at 3-4 (1987).
152. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-8528 (2000). However, this benefit is
not available to all. Officers who graduated from the service academies (e.g.
West Point or Annapolis), or received a Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC) scholarship to study at a non-military university, are not eligible to
participate. Id. § 3011(c)(3).
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statutory construction, 156 the current G.I. Bill, because it was en-
acted after USFSPA, should have priority. Although the courts
could help with this apparent conflict, case law has yet to shed
light on this apparent conflict.
As a result of these and other issues, there have been numer-
ous calls to modify the USFSPA. Some have been successful;157
most have not.
V. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A. Attempts to Modify the USFSPA
In 1997, Representative Bob Stump (R-AZ) introduced the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Equity Act of 1997 to correct
some perceived inequities.58 This measure had two major provi-
sions: (1) to stop the payments to former spouses upon their re-
marriage and (2) to calculate any division of retired pay upon the
rank and length of service at the time of the divorce decree. 15 9 The
measure languished in the House Ways and Means Committee
and the House National Security Committee. 60
In 1999, Representative Stump tried again. In addition to the
provisions of the 1997 bill, the Uniformed Services Former Spouse
Equity Act of 1999 would also have limited both the jurisdiction of
courts over out-of-state service members,161 as well as the time for
spouses to have their divorce decrees modified to reflect the Act.
Without such a time limitation, some service members could be
exposed to further court actions,162 seemingly ad infinitum. This
bill also died in the two committees. 63
In the next Congress, Representative Cass Ballenger (R-NC)
introduced the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Equity Act of
2001, containing the same provisions of the 1999 act. 64 Hearings
156. Courts presume Congress is aware of existing law when it passes a
statute, so the more recent statute controls in the event of a conflict. Farmer
v. McDaniel, 98 F.3d 1548, 1556 (9th Cir. 1996).
157. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
158. H.R. Res. 2537, 105th Cong. (1997), WL 1997 CONGUSHR 2537.
159. See id.
160. See Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 2537 (1997).
161. See H.R. 72, 106th Cong. (1999).
162. Id.
163. See Bill Tracking Report, H.R. Res. 72.
164. Compare H.R. 1983, 107th Cong. (2001) with H.R. 72.
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were held in early 2002, but the bill remained in committee. 165 Re-
introduced in 2003,166 it still has not moved from committee. 167
The measures proposed in the last four Congresses would be
logical limits on the Act, but the political process has unfortu-
nately prevented any such refinement. The current burdens on the
service members continue, creating, in the words of one witness
before Congress, "an even larger class of victims than the former
spouses it was designed to assist .... " 168 These small measures,
though would be a good start, would not address all the problems
with the Act.
B. Congress Has a Duty to Act
As shown in Part II.B. above, there exists ambiguity in inter-
preting the current language of the USFSPA. Through this legis-
lation, Congress clearly intended to allow state courts to consider
the military retirement pay as marital property in divorce settle-
ments. 69 As clear as the denotation of "may" is in the Act's
authority for the states, 70 debate exists about the extent to which
Congress intended to create a certain presumption of division and
whether the level of payments authorized by the statute 71 was in-
tended to be a limit on the states as well.
Recognizing the dicta in McCarty, Barker, and Mansell, Con-
gress's authority and responsibility to remedy the problems with
165. H.R. 1111, 108th Cong. (2003).
166. See Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 1111.
167. Id.
168. Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee, 107th Cong.(2002) (statement of Dennis M. Duggan, Deputy Director of the National Se-
curity and Foreign Relations Committee of the American Legion), 2002 WL
414432 (F.D.C.H.).
169. H.R. REP. No. 97-305, at 10 (1982).
170. "Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat
disposable retired pay payable to the member ... either as property solely of
the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with
the law of the jurisdiction of such court." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2000).
171. "The total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable
under all court orders pursuant to subsection (c) may not exceed 50 percent of
such disposable retired pay." Id. § 1408(e)(1). "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member
payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this
section ... may not exceed 65 percent of the amount of the retired pay pay-
able to such member." Id. §1408(4)(B).
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the USFSPA can be directly inferred from the Constitution. 172 In-
herent in the power "to raise and support armies"173 and "provide
and maintain a Navy" 74 lies the power to provide compensation
for members of those forces. In addition, the Constitution provides
strong support for the notion that Congress, with the powers dis-
cussed above, possesses the primary responsibility for military
compensation. In the Preamble, one of the first justifications for
the Constitution is to "provide for the common defense." 75 The
boundaries between the federal and state governments are drawn
later in the document since the states may not "without the Con-
sent of Congress ... keep Troops."' 76 Given the express delegation
to Congress, one can logically assume the Framers intended for
the states to retain only limited authority in this area. These pro-
visions also recognize that an individual state might fail to em-
brace the national concerns inherent in military law issues. For
example, if a divorce would result in payment of state benefits to
one of the parties, the state would have an incentive to maximize
the payments from the out-of-state party.'77 After all, it is logical
to anticipate that the state courts would feel a responsibility to-
wards the spouse living in their state, not only through his or her
citizenship, but also for the protection of any minor children in-
172. The Department of Defense conducts a survey of total military com-
pensation every four years and reports to Congress on the results. 37 U.S.C. §
1008(b)(2000). This survey, titled the Quadrennial Review of Military Com-
pensation, is used to target money where it will do the most good in recruit-
ing and retention of armed forces personnel. United States Dep't of Def.,
Press Release 248-02, "Ninth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
Released," May 17, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/b0517
2002_bt248-02.html. There has been only one study done of the Act and that
was at the direction of Congress by the National Defense Authorization Act of
1998. This report found that Congress's goals with the Act have largely been
fulfilled, but that substantial inequities remained. A Report to Congress Con-
cerning Former Spouse Protection Laws, U.S. Dep't of Def., 1, 69, available at
http:/www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/finalrpt.pdf.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
174. Id. cl. 13.
175. Id. pmbl.
176. Id. art. I, §10, cl. 3.
177. This problem goes to the very heart of diversity jurisdiction in federal
courts and removal provisions for out-of-state residents. See China Basin
Props. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
see also 16 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.03
(3rd ed. 1997) (discussing rationale for removal jurisdiction to protect out-of-
state residents from prejudice in state courts).
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volved. The protection of the service members, however, must be a
concern as well. This concern goes beyond equitable considerations
and extends to the impact that these unresolved issues could have
on the readiness of the nation based on the potential effect on the
armed forces.
C. Impact of Congress's Failure to Act.
Although the division of military retirement pay might seem a
fairly narrow issue, it carries broad implications. To avoid a num-
ber of practical issues in the administration of the armed forces,
the federal government must protect service members from abuse
by the states. Rather than disparate treatment from state to state,
federal intervention would offer equal treatment to all military
personnel.
Service in the armed forces obligates one to serve throughout
our nation and abroad. Traditionally, individual desires have
some influence on the assignment process, but the needs of the
service always take precedence. 178 In order to be promoted, the
service members' desires will normally conform to a "desired" ca-
reer path set out by each service. 179 In reality, the service mem-
ber's freedom of choice may actually be quite limited.180 As a
result, service members can be assigned in states not of their
choosing. Some states exercise jurisdiction over marriages to the
maximum extent allowed by the Constitution.181 To the extent
states exercise jurisdiction over a marriage, they also exercise ju-
risdiction over marital property such as a pension 8 2 Therefore,
one potential unintended consequence of military service is that a
service member could be subject to jurisdiction in various states
178. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 18 (illustrating that the military can
determine where military members reside).
179. For example, desired career paths for all Air Force officer careers are
well-defined and specific. They are published on the Internet at
http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/ofcr-cpguide/default.htm.
180. Accompanying verbiage in these career path depictions, as well as
logic, advises that the suggested career paths reflect personal development of
the service members as well as the needs of the service. See id.
181. See Rosemarie T. Ring, Personal Jurisdiction and Child Support: Es-
tablishing the Parent-Child Relationship as Minimum Contacts, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1125, 1139-1140 (2001).
182. See SITARZ, supra note 89.
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employing widely varying interpretations of federal laws, specifi-
cally the USFSPA.
Although certainly it would be contrary to the military tradi-
tion of obedience to authority, continued divergent interpretations
of the Act could result in service members avoiding assignments
in certain states. 8 3 Such extreme measures could force Congress's
hand to remedy state by state variations in military divorce law.184
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The discussions above would tend to indicate that USFSPA
requires some fine-tuning, both in substance and procedure. This
Comment has highlighted many of these issues. This final section
offers some solutions, each would provide some relief if enacted.
Although these proposals could complicate the application of the
Act for both the state courts and the military pay system, both en-
tities have an obligation to treat military retirees equitably. Past
attempts to improve the USFSPA have yet to yield the necessary
results. 85 The first and best solution is for Congress to ensure a
single interpretation of the USFSPA by the states to prevent dis-
parate treatment of military retirees.
A. Supremacy Clause
One simple way for Congress to control inappropriate state
division of military retirement pay is to provide further guidance
to the states regarding the interaction of the USFSPA with other
statutes, such as the Montgomery GI Bill.186 A supremacy clause
offers clear guidance for the courts, states, and the public to rec-
oncile competing statutes. As the Supreme Court held in McCarty,
Congress must provide this clarity.18 7
183. The Supreme Court acknowledged such a possibility in McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 234 (1981).
184. Although the military can influence legislation through the Presi-
dent, military members, through their First Amendment right to association,
have a lobbying forum - the Military Coalition - a coalition of organizations
committed to a strong national defense and support for service members. See
The Military Coalition Online at http://www.themilitarycoalition.org.
185. See generally Kuenzli, supra note 14; Bradley, supra note 17. These
articles provide an in-depth look at the various legislation.
186. See supra Part notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
187. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 236.
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A supremacy clause should be simple and direct. Congress
has included a supremacy clause in federal legislation in anticipa-
tion of problems with state laws. For example, the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 provides, ".... the
provisions of this title... shall supercede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate ... ."188 Although the
supremacy clause in ERISA established federal law supremacy
over state law, a similar provision could prioritize interaction be-
tween federal laws.
A supremacy clause could read: "In division of military re-
tirement pay in divorces, state courts are to ensure that military
members have reasonably sufficient income to make the transition
to civilian life upon retirement from active military service, in-
cluding post-military education and disability considerations."
B. Shift in Approach
The calls for changes to the USFSPA likely will not cease un-
til some fundamental changes have been made. 89 The proposed
legislative amendments have generally sought substantial reduc-
tions in payments to the spouse rather than procedural changes to
ensure fairness for the service member.' 90 Any proposal to termi-
nate an ex-spouse's right to payments is untenable from a practi-
cal standpoint and enflames a great deal of passion.'9 ' The
implementation of changes to the Act will require a cooperative
approach, rather than the adversarial approach currently em-
ployed, to emphasize equitable settlements.'92
Provisions should be made to ensure that the division of re-
tirement pay adequately reflects Congress's intent in passing the
188. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2002).
189. A bill proposing major changes has been introduced in the last four
Congresses. See supra Part V.A.
190. Id.
191. See Kuenzli, supra note 14, at 2; see also Bradley supra note 17, at
42. The authors note the passions and inequities, generally favoring the
spouse. Id.
192. It will be necessary to bring in all interested parties, perhaps with
the American Bar Association (ABA) ensuring a balanced approach. There is
precedent for the ABA to assist in proposing military legislation. See gener-
ally Jack Finney Lane, Jr., Evidence and the Administrative Discharge
Board, 55 MIL. L. REV. 95 (1972) (recounting the role of the ABA in recom-
mending changes in the military justice system).
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Act. Relating back to the concerns about the disruption to the non-
military spouse's education and career, the division of retirement
pay should compensate the spouse for only the actual impact of
that disruption. If the spouse suffered no disruption, the compen-
sation should be reduced, particularly if the spouse acquired an
education and established a career during the marriage. Such an
interpretation follows from the well-accepted concept of American
law to recover only for harms actually suffered, thereby prevent-
ing unjust enrichment.193
C. Minimize the Impact of Disparate Treatment
1. Delay of the Division
If unable, or unwilling, to create a uniform interpretation of
the USFSPA among the states, Congress could take a number of
steps to minimize the impact of the disparity.
One measure would be to delay the division of military re-
tirement pay until typical civilian retirement age. 194 By this point,
the military retiree should have successfully transitioned to civil-
ian life and started a new career. This would address the inequity
of the divorced military retiree having the same recall commit-
ment as the non-divorced retiree for a lesser compensation. 95 It
should also reduce the number of retirees experiencing a division
of retirement pay and child support simultaneously. The advance
notice of the division of retirement pay would allow the retiree to
plan for the loss of income and compensate for any "surprise" di-
vorces that severely disrupt financial planning. While arguments
certainly would be made that such a provision would hurt the
spouse, fairness to the service member should override the ability
of the spouse to insist upon a pension, not directly earned by that
spouse, so early in life.
Alternatively, establishment of a "safe zone" for the retiree
would harmonize the Act with the difficult transition to civilian
life. As many retirees experience a temporary pay setback upon
193. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) (discussing the con-
cept of unjust enrichment under federal law).
194. For active duty retirements, military retirement pay starts immedi-
ately; reserve pay starts at age 60. This statement refers to a typical retire-
ment age of 55-65. See supra Introduction.
195. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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retirement, retirees with predominately military-specific skills
face a more difficult transition best solved by education or voca-
tional training. Delay of the retirement pay division of up to five
years would allow the service member to complete an educational
degree and would equalize the disparity between those retirees
possessing skills transferable directly to the civilian job market
and those possessing only possessing combat-oriented skills.
2. Review of the Division
Another strategy to reduce the impact of disparate state
treatment would be to review the division of the retirement pay at
a reasonable time after the divorce. Since the division of military
retirement pay is viewed as a property settlement, the court di-
vides the pension once and never reviews the division again. Al-
though technically considered a property settlement, the payment
of military retirement pay over a period of time takes on the char-
acteristic of compensation for loss of earnings analogous to ali-
mony. As child support payments and alimony are normally
reviewed on a regular basis, the division of retirement pay should
also be reviewable on a set-time basis or triggered by a change in
the former spouse's financial situation. A substantial inheritance
by the former spouse would represent one extreme scenario that
would make the continued division of the service member's re-
tirement pay morally suspect. This measure would put a "check
and balance" in the system and could potentially overcome dispar-
ity in the divorce process for the military retirees.
D. Procedural Due Process
Part III.B. identified a possible extension of Apprendi into
USFSPA applications on due process grounds. Although introduc-
tion of juries into military divorce actions may meet with substan-
tial resistance, other procedural changes could better protect
military respondents from states eager to jump into the fray to di-
vide the military retirement pay.
First and foremost is the need for competent legal counsel,
experienced in military divorce actions, paid for by the state exer-
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cising jurisdiction over out-of-state military retirees. 1 Second is
assurance that trial court judges are fully aware of the unique
characteristics of the military retirement system when making di-
visions under the Act.197 Third, out-of-state military retiree re-
spondents need to have an automatic right of appeal, without fees,
to adequately balance federal and state concerns. 98 Fourth, a bi-
furcated approach could help solve the problems of unequal set-
tlements. Local courts could remain responsible for granting the
divorce, calculation of child support, and alimony under existing
rules in one court procedure, but a specially-designated court
would address the division of retirement pay. 99 Although these
measures could be costly, protection of our military requires noth-
ing less.
Congress should factor the treatment of the military by state
courts in decisions on military basing and major contract awards.
Since these decisions correspond to the exposure of military mem-
bers to a state's courts, a rational relationship exists for such an
approach. The more bases and contracts in a state, the more mili-
tary personnel required, thereby increasing the number of people
exposed to that state's court system. While a politically difficult
measure, it is one that could be easily implemented by Congress
and the civilian leadership of the military.
196. The question of qualification for these attorneys arises. The American
spirit will most likely provide the answer in some sort of certification pro-
gram as soon as the requirement is established.
197. The author's own experience shows that courts may try to analogize
military retirement to police and firefighter retirement systems. See Akins v.
U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 721 F.2d 652, 653 (9th Cir. 1983). Such an analogy must
fail based on the characterization of military retired pay in the Introduction.
Most states have continuing legal education requirements for judges and this
could be incorporated therein. See National Organization for Women Legal
Defense and Education Fund, National Judicial Education Program, at
http://www.nowldef.org/html/njep/ index.shtml.
198. Eleven states do not have an intermediate appeals court - Delaware,
Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Peter L. Murray, Maine's
Overburdened Law Court: Has Time Come for a Maine Appeals Court?, 52
ME. L. REV. 43, 67 (2000). In New Hampshire and West Virginia, there is no
right of appeal. Id.
199. The divisible divorce doctrine stems from Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674
(1949), where the Court held that a state may grant a divorce, but may not
divide property of the out-of-state spouse without personal jurisdiction. See
id. at 678-679 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
This Comment has taken a focused approach to a complex mix
of state and federal law. While the issues are not overly difficult
technically, they are difficult politically and emotionally. The im-
portance of this issue, however, requires substantial refinements
of a fundamentally good idea. The pendulum of military divorce
law swung from the service members, in the aftermath of
McCarty, to the spouses, in the aftermath of the USFSPA. The
time has come for the pendulum to swing back towards the mid-
dle.
The USFSPA was a needed measure to ensure that spouses
could have all marital assets considered in a divorce settlement-
certainly a laudable goal. At the time of enactment, Congress in-
cluded safeguards for the service members, but experience has
shown these to be inadequate. In addition to the law being poten-
tially inequitable as written, the state courts have interpreted the
USFSPA in divergent ways, resulting in disparate treatment of
service members. Congressional attempts to substantially modify
the USFSPA have yet to reach fruition. Congressional action is
necessary to protect the rights of service members in state courts,
particularly when those courts exercise jurisdiction over out-of-
state service members. Not only does Congress have a moral duty
to act, but since this is a military issue, it has a Constitutional
one.
Larry D. White2oo
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